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Citizenship: Spanish

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Employment

- Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Alicante, Sept 2007-Present (currently on leave).

Education

- Ph.D. in Economics, University of Toronto, Canada, 2007.
  Dissertation: "Essays on the Economics of Information and Competition."
  Committee: Ettore Damiano, Martin J. Osborne, Aloysius Siow.

- M.A. in Economics, University of Toronto, Canada, 2001.

- Honours B.A. in Management and Business Administration, University of the Basque Country, Spain, 1999.

Research Interests

Industrial Organization, Economics of Information, Applied Microeconomic Theory and Game Theory, Experimental Economics, Public Economics.

Research Papers

- "Harmful Quality of Information and Welfare in a Two-Sided Asymmetric Information Model", Job-market paper, *Submitted*.

- "Quality of Information and Price Ceilings", Working Paper, *Submitted*.

- "Quality of Information, Competition and Revelation", Working Paper, *Submitted*.

- "The Gender Division of Labor Revisited", Working paper, *Submitted*.

- "Public Goods: Voluntary Contributions and Risk" with Miguel A. Sánchez Villalba, Working Paper.

- "Activist and Conservative Rules for Standards", with Carlos Oyarzún, Working Paper, *Submitted*.

- "Hybrid Lotteries to Finance Public Goods: Efficiency, Equity and Weak Dominance" with Miguel A. Sánchez Villalba, Work In Progress.

- "Hybrid Lottery vs. Fixed-Prize and Pari-mutuel Lotteries" with Miguel Sánchez Villalba, Work In Progress.

- "Quality Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Welfare" with Miguel Sánchez Villalba, Work In Progress.

Participation in Research Funds

- Funds from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness under project ECO2012-34928: "The micro-foundations of economics complexity: theory, behavior, and policy", 2013-2016.

- Funds from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation and FEDER funds under project SEJ2007-62656: "Decision and interaction processes in socioeconomic environments", 2007-2013.

- Funds from the University of Alicante, Applied Microeconomics (GIMA), 2010-2013.

- IVIE Grant for economic research under the project "The Timing of Contributions to Public Goods", 2010.

Professional Activities

- Co-organizer, Theory Workshop, University of Alicante, 2011-2012.

- Scientific Committee Member, ASSET Annual Meeting, Alicante, 2010.

- Local Organizer, ASSET Annual Meeting, Alicante, 2010.

- Local organizer, "Conference on Matching Models in Economics", Toronto, 2004.

Refereeing Experience

International Economic Review, Journal of Public Economics, Canadian Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Dynamics, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Econometrica, American Economic Review.

Teaching Experience

Instructor

- Statistics I, B.A. in Economics, University of Alicante, 2012-2013.
- Microeconomic Theory, First Sequence, Ph.D. in Quantitative Economics, University of Alicante, 2010-2012.
- Strategic Decision Making, International Business Program, University of Alicante, 2011-2012.
- Introduction to Microeconomics, B.A. in Economics, University of Alicante, 2011-2012.
- Intermediate Microeconomics, B.A. in Economics, University of Alicante, 2007-2011.
- Economics of Crime, B.A. in Criminology, University of Alicante, 2007-2010.
- Intermediate Microeconomics, University of Toronto, summer 2006.

Teaching Assistant (2000-2007)

- Microeconomic Theory, M.A. in Economics, University of Toronto.
- Math-Stat Review, M.A. in Economics, University of Toronto.
- Game Theory and Applications, B.A. in Economics, University of Toronto.
- Advanced Microeconomics, B.A. in Economics, University of Toronto.
- Mathematical Methods for Economic Theory, B.A. in Economics, University of Toronto.
- Intermediate Microeconomics, University of Toronto.
- Introduction to Economics, University of Toronto.

Teaching Interests

Microeconomics, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Economics of Information, Mathematics, Statistics, Econometrics.

Awards and Fellowships

- University of Toronto TATP Excellence in Teaching Award, 2007.

- Department of Economics Excellence in Teaching Award by Teaching Assistants, University of Toronto, 2007.

- University of Toronto Thesis Completion Grant, 2005-2007.

- University of Toronto Graduate Fellowship, 2003-2005.

- Basque Government Fellowship for the Researchers Training Program, 2000-2003.

Participation in Conferences and Seminars

2013 Florence Workshop on Behavioral and Experimental Economics (Florence, May 2013); 10th EBES Conference (Istanbul, May 2013); SING 7 (Paris, July 2011); 34th Symposium of Economic Analysis (Valencia, December 2009); Jornadas de Economía Industrial (Vigo, September 2009); 33th Symposium of Economic Analysis (Zaragoza, December 2008); Workshop on Gender Economics (Granada, June 2008); International Symposium on Economic Theory, Policy and Applications (Athens, August 2008); Weekly Seminar at the University of the Basque Country (Bilbao, April 2008); Canadian Economics Association Annual Meetings (Halifax, June 2007); Weekly Seminar at the University of Alicante (Alicante, March 2007); Canadian Economics Association Annual Meetings (Toronto, June 2004).

Presentations by co-authors

ASSET Annual Meeting (Limassol, Cyprus, November 2012); Seminar at University of Navarra (Pamplona, April 2012); 36th Symposium of Economic Analysis (Malaga, December 2011); Weekly Seminar at the University of Valencia (Valencia, September 2011); Public Economic Theory Annual Meeting (PET11) (Bloomington, June 2011); Theory Workshop at the University of Alicante (Alicante, December 2010); ASSET Annual Meeting (Alicante, October 2010).

Other Activities

- Internship at the financial institution Bilbao Bizkaia Kutxa (BBK) (Bilbao, summer 1999).

- Volunteer Work: "Out of the cold" program (Toronto, 2004-2006), Catholic Catechist (Alicante, 2007-2011).

Languages

English (Fluent); Spanish (Native); Basque (Advance); Mandarin (Beginner).

References

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Selected Research (Statement)

- **"Harmful Quality of Information in a Two-Sided Asymmetric Information Model"** (Job-market paper).

  This paper discusses the role of prices as signals of quality in a monopolistic two-sided asymmetric information model. The precision of the public information is made endogenous through revelation. If the market partial-pooling price is sufficiently responsive to information, improving the quality of private signals harms the consumer. Standardization decreases the value of private information to the consumer. It also decreases the precision of the public information for some parameter values.

- **"Quality of Information and Price Ceilings"** (Working Paper).

  I analyze the imposition of a binding price ceiling in a two-sided asymmetric information monopolistic model. Equilibria involving consumers loss exist for all parameter values. A complete characterization of the equilibria is provided. I discuss the role of consumers private information on the equilibrium revelation, on the incidence of loss and on trade. I demonstrate that the equilibrium incidence of loss is non-monotonic in information. This result holds if and only if the price ceiling is above (below) the ex-ante expected valuation of the good when the consumer's information is private (public). Better information is not socially desirable if and only if the high-quality seller's reservation price is sufficiently high, the prior belief takes intermediate values and the consumer's private signal is not too informative. The public disclosure of the buyers private information is efficient. However, the consumer loses from its disclosure if and only if the prior belief is very biased toward the low quality product or it is just biased and the information is very precise. Better information is now detrimental to the buyer if and only if the prior belief is biased toward the high quality product.

- **"Quality of Information, Competition and Revelation"** (Working Paper).

  I analyze a repeated game using a two-sided asymmetric information oligopolistic model. A group of sellers compete for selling their good in the market each period. I assume that two exogenously given qualities, which are represented by sellers types, are offered in the market. Prices are fixed. Low quality sellers choose to either charge the lower market price or the higher price. We show that a more precise customers private information leads to less information revelation and a higher incidence of loss in equilibrium for some parameter values. Furthermore, we show that the seller's information revelation is non-decreasing in the level of market competition in equilibrium. We conclude that the more competitive a market is, the less precise the market prices may be as signals of quality for intermediate private information precisions.

- **"The Gender Division of Labor Revisited"** (Working paper).

The aim of this paper is to explain the phenomenon of the sexual division of labor in a society which treats the sexes equally and that is characterized by heterogeneity and nonrandom matching. Premarital investments and heterogeneous aptitudes determine the individuals abilities at two tasks and hence, their desirability on the marriage market. I show that the sexual division of labor is an equilibrium outcome in large marriage markets if the fraction of males differ substantially from the fraction of females, or if the individuals have a high aptitude on average at the task the sex that is in majority is trained in. Furthermore, it constitutes an equilibrium outcome in all types of markets if every agent is guaranteed to have a high ability at performing at least one task as long as complete training in that task were to be received by the agent. Finally, the training-according-to-sex can help coordinate people efficiently in the choice of premarital investments in small markets, which are characterized by a high risk associated to mismatches in the population.

- **"Public Goods: Voluntary Contributions and Risk"** with Miguel A. Sánchez Villalba (Working Paper).

We test two incentives mechanisms that are based on nonlinear subsidy schemes that change the public good voluntary contribution game from a Prisoners Dilemma to a Stag Hunt game: (a) the Hybrid Lottery (mentioned below), with two treatments exhibiting different degrees of endogenous risk (i.e., the possibility of failing to coordinate on the Pareto efficient equilibrium); and (b) the Relative Time Subsidy Scheme, in which rebates are a function of the relative time of contributions (a costless extra dimension which is useful in generating price-discrimination among participants since early contributors are rewarded heavily in relative terms). An exogenous risk originates from the variability in payoffs associated to the tournament. Different combinations of exogenous and endogenous risk levels are analyzed in six experimental treatments. Our main findings are that: (i) both mechanisms (a and b) are effective means of financing public good provision (both mechanisms out-perform a standard voluntary contribution mechanism); (ii) controlling for endogenous risk, offering rebates with no variability in payoffs (no exogenous risk) increases significantly performance. As a result, the Hybrid Lottery outclasses the Relative Time Subsidy Scheme mechanism in eliciting contributions; (iii) controlling for exogenous risk, the elimination of endogenous risk (contributing is made a weakly dominant strategy) does not significantly increase performance.

- **"Activist and Conservative Rules for Standards"**, with Carlos Oyarzún (Working Paper).

A manager sets a standard on a noisy signal to either accept or reject a candidate who may or may not be qualified for the position. Wrong decisions, i.e., accepting unqualified candidates and rejecting qualified candidates are costly. Unqualified candidates may exert an effort in order to improve their signal distribution and, hence, increase

their chances to meet the standard. We show that ex-post harsh and soft standards, in comparison to those that would be efficient ex post given the evidence, are ex-ante optimal when the standard and the level of effort of unqualified candidates are strategic complements and strategic substitutes, respectively.

- **"Hybrid Lotteries to Finance Public Goods: Efficiency, Equity and Weak Dominance"** with Miguel A. Sánchez Villalba (Work In Progress).

  A new mechanism to raise funds is proposed in this theoretical paper. The "hybrid lottery" is a variation of a pari-mutuel lottery in which a nonlinear decreasing fraction of total gross contributions is rebated in the form of prizes. The negative externality exerted on the other players through further contributions to the public good is so powerful that the decrease in the prize amount increases the public good provision sufficiently enough as to overcompensate the higher private cost of contributing. This key feature of the hybrid lottery makes of it a superior mechanism to the fixed-prize lottery (analyzed by Morgan 5 (RES, 2000)). If properly designed, contributing the social optimal level could be made a weakly dominant strategy for each agent and zero payments in form of rebates (null prize) made in equilibrium by the principal (i.e., the first best can be implemented).

- **"Hybrid Lottery vs. Fixed-Prize and Pari-mutuel Lotteries"** with Miguel Sánchez Villalba (Work In Progress).

  This is an experimental paper where we intend to compare three different types of lotteries (the Hybrid Lottery, the Fixed-Prize Lottery and the Pari-mutuel Lottery) and the all pay auction as fund-raising mechanisms and investigate which one performs better in different environments (characterized by different group sizes and marginal per capita returns on the public good) under complete information.

- **"Quality Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Welfare"** with Miguel Sánchez Villalba (Work In Progress).

  We study a theoretical framework with quality uncertainty by both market parties. The information gap between consumers and traders is decreased as the information owned by the party with the least accurate private information gets more precise. The main purpose of the article is to investigate the relationship between the degree of relative information asymmetries, trade and welfare. We also study under which conditions the relative quality of private information is not the only parameter relevant to the model and the parties absolute information precisions also matter, and how they do matter.