Should relevance theory analyse what is non-propositional, non-intentional but yet affects the eventual relevance?
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1. Prototypical scope of cognitive pragmatics: Recovery of intended explicit and/or implicated interpretations (propositions) plus higher-level explicatures (propositional attitude)

There is a very good reason for anyone concerned with the role of inference in communication to assume that what is communicated is propositional: it is relatively easy to say what propositions are, and how inference might operate over propositions. No one has any clear idea how inference might operate over non-propositional objects: say, over images, impressions or emotions. Propositional contents and attitudes thus seem to provide the only relatively solid ground on which to base a partly or wholly inferential approach to communication (S&W 1995: 57).

2. Extension of scope of research: Affective attitude: feelings, emotions and impressions felt by the speaker upon producing the utterance (and intended to be communicated)

Mary and Peter are newly arrived at the seaside. She opens the window overlooking the sea and sniffs appreciatively and ostensively. When Peter follows suit, there is no one particular good thing that comes to his attention: the air smells fresh, fresher than it did in town, it reminds him of their previous holidays, he can smell the sea, seaweed, ozone, fish; all sorts of pleasant things come to mind, and while, because her sniff was appreciative, he is reasonably safe in assuming that she must have intended him to notice at least some of them, he is unlikely to be able to pin down her intentions any further (S&W 1995: 55).

3. Extension of scope of research: Weak implicatures, some of which are backed up by the speaker and some are extracted by the hearer's sole responsibility

We have argued that there is a continuum of cases, from implicatures which the hearer was specifically intended to recover to implicatures which were merely intended to be made manifest, and to further modifications of the mutual cognitive environment of speaker and hearer that the speaker only intended in the sense that she intended her utterance to be relevant, and hence to have rich and not entirely foreseeable cognitive effects (S&W 1995: 201).

Clearly, the weaker the implicatures, the less confidence the hearer can have that the particular premises or conclusions he supplies will reflect the speaker's thoughts, and this is where the indeterminacy lies. However, people may entertain different thoughts and come to have different beliefs on the basis of the same cognitive environment. The aim of communication in general is to increase the mutuality of cognitive environments rather than guarantee an impossible duplication of thoughts (S&W 1995: 200).

4. Proposal of extension: To add the terms contextual constraint and non-intended non-propositional effect to the chart of the (ir)relevance of communication

The term constraint will be restricted to aspects that underlie or “frame” communication and interaction (i.e. they exist prior to the interpretive activity) and constrain its eventual (un)successful outcome. By contrast, the term non-intentional non-propositional effect will refer to feelings, emotions, impressions, etc. which are not overtly intended, but are generated from the act of communication, and add (positively) to the cognitive effects derived from utterance interpretation or add (negatively) to the mental effort required for processing the utterance.

These may not be part of the actual relevance of the information communicated, but it utterly important to determine the success or failure of the act of communication as a whole.