We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as α-equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation that nobody else might argue to be inequitable. It turns out that α-equity is compatible with efficiency. Our analysis fills a gap in the literature by giving normative support to the allocations improving, in terms of efficiency, the Student Optimal Stable allocation.
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